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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
JERRY L. LOCKE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 19067 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Jerry L. Locke, was charged with 
Burglary, a second Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-202 (1978), and Theft, a Class A Misdemenaor in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1978) 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried by the court and convicted of 
Burglary and Theft on February 9, 1983 in the Third Judicial 
District Court, the Honorable Scott Daniels, Judge, presiding. 
Appellant was sentenced on February 9, 1983 to an 
indeterminate term of one to fifteen years imprisonment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming 
the conviction and sentence of Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Mr. Wendell Hibler and Mrs. Carol Hibler resided for 
thirty years in a home located at 4341 West 5415 south, Salt 
Lake County. They lived there with their son, Philip Hibler, 
and their grandson, Timothy Hibler (T. n). Mr. Wendell 
Hibler has since passed away, dying one week prior to the date 
of trial ( T. 51 ) • 
On Sunday, December 6, 1981 Mr. and Mrs. Hibler left 
their home at 3:30 p.m. to attend a dinner engagement in Salt 
Lake City. Neither their son nor their grandson was at home 
( T. 35). Before departing they had locked al 1 the doors and 
windows in the house. They returned home at 10:00 p.m. that 
same evening (T. 35, 36). Mrs. Hibler, upon entering the 
house, immediately became aware of the cold temperature inside 
and proceeded to investigate (T. 37). When she entered their 
bedroom she observed that the inside storm window had been 
pushed as ise and that the outside bedroom window was open ( T. 
38). The window was of the type that swings in and out when 
cranked by a handle on the inside (T. 34). The window was 
damaged and the window arm later had to be replaced (T. 80, 
81). The window appeared to have been sprung (T. 100). 
outside and below the open window was a three foot high stool 
that was normally kept elsewhere (T. 39, 40). Inside the 
bedroom there was evidence that a plant had been moved. 
Clothing belonging to Mr. Hibler was found lying on the floor. 
Pieces of that clothing had been torn (T. 42). The dresser 
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drawers were partly opened (T. 99). Missing from the home 
were several dollars in currency, a savings bank containing 
approximately S30.00 in coin, and a silver necklace valued at 
$124.00 (T. 44, 45, 48). 
During a subsequent sheriff's investigation, Deputy 
John Bell, an indentification technician with the Salt Lake 
County Sheriff's Office, was called to the scene. Officer 
Bell began an investigation of the crime area by dusting for 
latent fingerprints. Fresh smudges were visible on the 
outside of the open bedroom window (T. 113, 119), and several 
clear latent prints were lifted from the lower right inside 
corner of the window. The window was hinged on the left (T. 
120, 121). These latent prints were later compared with a 
known ink impression of the fingerprints of appellant, Jerry 
L. Locke (T. 124, 125). The result was a positive matching of 
the latent prints lifted from the crime scene with 
fingerprints from a finger on both the right and left hands of 
appellant (T. 132, 133, 135). 
Investigation further revealed that at approximately 
8:30 p.m. on Sunday, December 6, 1981 a neighbor of the 
Hiblers, Geri Winkler, passed a male who resembled appellant 
on the sidewalk several doors from the Hibler Home (T. 66, 67, 
71). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ALLOWED AN EXPERT 
WITNESS, QUALIFIED IN THE SCIENCE OF 
FINGERPRINT IDENTIFICATION, TO GIVE 
TESTIMONY UNDER RULE 702, UTAH RULES OF 
EVIDENCE. 
Appellant claims that the tr- i al cour-t er-r-ed when it 
per-mitted Officer- Bell of the Salt Lake county Sher-iff's 
Office, a technician tr-ained in the science of finger-pr-int 
identification, to testify that appellant's finger-pr-ints 
matched those found at the scene of the cr-ime because Officer 
Bell's tr-aining was purportedly inadequate. 
Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence pr-ovides: 
If scientific, technical, or other-
specialized knowledge will assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence 
or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, 
skill, experience, training, or education, 
may testify ther-eto in the form of an 
opinion or- other-wise. 
Respondent submits that Officer Bell was qualified as an 
expert pursuant to Rule 702 and that the tr-ial court proper-ly 
acted within its discretion in allowing officer- Bell's 
testimony at trial. When Officer Bell testified at trial, he 
had five years experince in law enforcement with 1 1/2 year-s 
of experience as an identification technician. He had 
graduated fran the Institute of Applied Science in finger-pr-int 
identification after completing a thir-teen month home study 
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course. And he had completerl a forty hour advance latent 
print course given by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
Officer Bell was an experienced technician having rolled on 
the average five sets of prints a week for a year and a half. 
He had been lifting latent prints for 1 1/2 years and had been 
involved in over 1,100 different cases. And he had compared 
approximately five latent prints a week against known 
fingerprint impressions. Officer Bell is a member of the 
International Association for Identification and he keeps 
abreast of his profession by studying the monthly literature 
sent out by that organization (T. 107, 108, 110, 115, 116). 
The question of a witness' qualification as an 
expert has traditionally been left to the sound discretion of 
the trial judge. "It is within the discretion of the trial 
court to determine the suitability of expert testimony in a 
case and the qualifications of the proposed expert witness." 
State v. Clayton, Utah, fi46 P.2d 723, 726 (1982). "Because of 
his position as the authority in charge of the trial, the 
trial judge should be allowed a reasonable latitude of 
discretion both as to the necessity for such expert testimony 
and as to the qualification of the witness to give it." 
Marsh v. Irvine, 22 Utah 2d 154, 158, 449 P.2d 996, 999 
(1969). The trial judge in the instant case scrutinized 
Officer Bell's credentials, found them acceptable and allowed 
him to testify. In doing so the trial judge did no more than 
exercise reasonable discretion as was his prerogative and 
duty. 
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The standard for reversal of a trial judge's 
decision to allow expert testimony was articulated in Lamb v. 
Bangart, Utah, 525 P.2d 602 (l'l74). "The trial court is 
allowed considerable latitude of discretion in the 
admissibility of expert testimony, and in the absence of a 
clear showing of abuse, this Court will not reverse." Lamb at 
607-608. This Court has further stated, "[t]he rulings of the 
district court on the admissibility of such testimony are not 
lightly disturbed on appeal, nor at all, unless it clearly 
appears that the judge was in error." Maltby v. Cox Const. 
Co., Inc., Utah, 598 P.2d 336, 340 (1979), cert. denied 444 
U.S. 945 (1979). Appellant fails to show any error or abuse 
of discretion, or to cite any case in support of his complaint 
that it was error or abuse of discretion for the trial court 
to allow officer Bell to testify. Indeed, the facts of this 
case demonstrate the contrary to be true. Officer Bell by 
both training and experince was qualified to testify regarding 
fingerprint identification. 
The cases from neighboring jurisdicitons cited by 
appeallant fully support the correctness of the trial court's 
decision in the present case. In Hardison v. State, Nevada, 
437 P.2d 868 (1968) no error or abuse of discretion was found 
where a police officer with similar training to that of 
Officer Bell was allowed to testify as an expert witness. The 
officer in that case had six months training from the 
Institute of Applied Science in fingerprint identification, 
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one year and four months on the job experience and studied the 
monthly F.B.I. bulletins. He had lifted approximately 1,000 
latent prints, had compared approximately 600 latent 
fingerprints with those in police files and had made fifteen 
positive comparisons. In the case at bar Officer Rell had 
completed thirteen months training from the Institute of 
Applied Science as well as an advanced F.B.I. course. He had 
1 1/2 years experience and had been involved in more than 
1,100 cases (T. 107, 108, 110). In Collins v. State, Nevada, 
488 P.2d 544 (1971) an officer who had completed a home study 
course in fingerprint identification with the Institute of 
Applied Science who had two years on the job experience, and 
who had made 1,000 fingerprint comparisons was held to have 
sufficient experience to testify as an expert witness. 
Officer Bell's experience is comparable to that of the officer 
in Collins. Nor was any error or abuse of discretion found in 
State v. Thomas, Washington, 533 P.2d 1357 (1976) where an 
officer was held qualified to give expert testimony who had 
1 1/2 years experience in the identification department, had 
lifted several hundred sets of fingerprints, and who possessed 
a two year college degree in law enforoement. Officer Bell's 
experience compares favorably with that of the officer in 
Thomas. 
Furthermore, "a challenge to the reliability of such 
expert testimony will be considered as not involving its 
competency but its weight and credibility, which is a matter 
-7-
for the jury to determine." Lamb v. Bangart, Utah, 525 P.2d 
602, 608 (1974). As long as a reasonable basis can be found 
to support the trial court's decision to allow the witness to 
testify as an expert, the testimony will be permitted as 
competent evidence. The witness' qualification then becomes a 
matter of the weight to be given the evidence which is decided 
by the trier of fact. Webb v. Olin Mathison Chem. Corp., 
Utah, 342 P.2d 1094 (1959). It is not a function of a 
reviewing court to weigh the evidence or credibility of 
witnesses. State in Interest of M----s----,Utah, 584 P.2d 914 
(1978); State v. Logan, Utah, 563 P.2d 811 (1977). Officer 
Bell clearly had sufficient education and experience for the 
trial court to have a reasonable basis to allow the testimony. 
The reliability of his testimony if in doubt is a matter of 
the weight to be given his evidence by the trier of the fact. 
Appellant on cross-examination had every opportunity to 
illuminate any weakness in Officer Bell's testimony or in his 
credentials as an expert witness. The court after hearing all 
of the evidence believed Officer Rell. Appellant has had a 
fair trial and was convicted on competent evidence which was 
properly admitted. 
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CONCLUSION 
Officer Bell possessed the requisite skill and 
knowledge to qualify as an expert in the field of fingerprint 
identification. The trial court acted properly and within its 
discretion in permitting Officer Rell to testify. 
Furthermore, the reliability of officer Bell's 
testimony is a matter of weight to be determined by the trier 
of fact. 
/ 
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